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In September 2010 the German business weekly,
WirtschaftsWoche, interviewed Mr. Pöhl on old and
new conflicts in the European Monetary Union, the
future of the euro and necessary structure reforms for
the ECB and the Bundesbank.
WirtschaftsWoche: Mr. Pöhl, the Bundesbank is caught
up in difficult times. How did you react to the recent
debate over Mr. Sarrazin, and what lessons should we
learn from it?
I do not want to comment on this issue in detail, but it
would surely make sense to change the Bundesbank
statute. One should give thought to reforming the proce-
dures for appointments to the executive board. As it now
stands it is too federalist. The influence of the federal
states on appointments to the executive board has his-
torical reasons that are no longer valid today. What ties
does the Bundesbank still have with the federal states?
My suggestion would be that only the federal govern-
ment make appointments to the executive board, and it
should include the Bundesbank in this decision making.
Another important issue is the European Monetary
Union. How do you evaluate the current debt crisis of
the euro countries?
I put no stock in the rescue programme for the euro
area. It gives the countries the wrong incentives and
violates the spirit and letter of the monetary union.
We never wanted a transfer union – but now we are
caught up in one. The rescue programme is, after all,
a traditional French position. Already in 1979 France
wanted a common European fund. Chancellor
Schmidt supported President Giscard d’Estaing on
this matter. Then the wish was to stabilise the
exchange rates in the European Monetary System
(EMS). The idea was that the member states could
borrow money from the fund with relative ease. Italy,
for example, would have been able to take out a loan
in deutschmarks and pay it back in lira. That would
have been a real inflation machine. The Bundesbank
was strictly opposed to this at the time, and a strong
confrontation with the federal government was the
result. Helmut Schmidt even threatened us with a
reform of the Bundesbank statute to deprive us of our
power. However, in the end we prevailed and the fund
did not come about. This time the French managed to
get their idea through, which could prove to be very
expensive for us. If countries such as Greece, Portugal
or Ireland do in fact make use of the rescue pro-
gramme, it will become prohibitively expensive.
Would there have been other options in your opinion?
Of course. Greece should never have been accepted
into the monetary union. But it was. Now it must be
possible to leave the union. Then, a haircut should
have been carried out (partial debt forgiveness by the
creditors), the Greeks would have devalued in order to
improve their competitiveness. But Mr. Sarkozy was
no doubt fearful of the French banks, which were
strongly committed in Greece.
Apart from the problem of technical feasibility – would-
n’t that have resulted in incredible turbulence?
That’s what many say, but I’m not so sure. There
might have been the risk of the monetary union col-
lapsing, but the risk was much smaller than most
believed. Greece is not really that important after all.
The core countries would have remained in the euro
area. I do not believe that there would have been
major deformations.
ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet has said again and
again that the Europeans are bound together by fate.
You were involved – as he is – in the process of Euro-
pean unification for many decades. Do Europeans share
a common fate?
We are indeed a community. But I do not see things
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him for decades, he is an honest man, and he would
never act against his convictions. It was certainly a
difficult situation at the beginning of May, when the
decision was made on the rescue programme. But I
don’t believe that Europe itself was threatened
because of Greece. The ECB unfortunately has
moved into turbulent waters by throwing major prin-
ciples overboard. It is now purchasing government
bonds from euro countries and is thus weakening its
independence.
Can this we undone?
In my opinion it is irreversible. They can’t ‘do this’one
minute and ‘do that’ the next. The bond purchases
and the rescue programme are a breach of the
Maastricht Treaty by mutual agreement. Of course it
was an emergency, but now it has also become a
precedent, and that is the great danger.
Now the situation on the financial markets has sta-
bilised somewhat and the euro is also on the road to
recovery ...
… which is still no justification for throwing your
principles overboard.
What can the ECB do to restore its credibility?
One possibility would be to make Axel Weber its
president in autumn next year. Mr. Weber stands
for stability policies that the Bundesbank still holds
high. It would be even more important, however, to
change the ECB statutes. At the beginning of the
1990s when we drafted the statutes, I strongly
favoured the principle of ‘one country one vote’.
That surprised many at the time. Weighting the
votes of a country according to economic strength
or population size, for example, would not have
succeeded politically. But the times have now
changed. Then I would not have considered it pos-
sible that countries such as Malta and Cyprus
would be included in the euro. I thought it would be
limited to the six founding members. Now the mon-
etary union has became larger than we originally
believed. And therefore the principle of ‘one coun-
try one vote’ is no longer in keeping with the times.
It is not acceptable for the central banks of Malta
or Cyprus to have the same voting power in the
ECB as the Bundesbank. This waters down the
decisions of the European Central Bank. Voting
rights in the ECB should be changed and weighted
votes should be assigned according to the strength
of the countries. This would help the ECB manage
future crises more convincingly.
Will there still be the euro in ten years?
I believe so, yes. The euro is irreversible. Perhaps there
will be a different euro, perhaps limited to fewer coun-
tries. This I consider possible and it would also be
desirable. But it will not cease to exist.
There is always tension between monetary policy and
government policy, as was the case during German
reunification. At the time, as President of the
Bundesbank, you spoke out against an immediate
German monetary union. How do you see this now –
20 years later?
The main issue at the time was the D-mark/GDR-
mark exchange rate. The experts at the time agreed
that a 1:1 exchange rate would be false economi-
cally. The correct rate would have been perhaps
three eastern marks to one D-mark. But this was
unacceptable for Mr. Kohl and Mr. Waigel. They
wanted to push through the monetary union and
simply overruled me and the Bundesbank. This
was one of the reasons I resigned, since it was a
policy I couldn’t support. Today I realise that there
had been enormous pressure. The east German
population wanted to finally have the prosperity
they had been dreaming about for decades. Just
imagine that wages in the east, with an exchange
rate of 3:1, would have fallen by around two thirds
– there would have been a popular uprising. In this
respect political reality was stronger than econom-
ic logic.
Looking back on your career, you came a long way from
a convinced social democrat to a market liberal ...
I have always been a liberal. Karl Schiller was my
great model at the SPD, and he was in fact a liberal.
That was certainly possible in the SPD of the 1970s
in the social-liberal coalition. The liberals (FDP)
had Otto Graf Lambsdorff, who was a friend of
mine. I always worked closely with Mr. Lambsdorff
and Mr. Genscher, much more so than with some
SPD ministers.
The liberal wing of the SPD does not exist anymore, at
least not since Wolfgang Clement’s withdrawal ...
… which is why I also left the party in 2005. I could
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With the policies of Mr. Beck and now Mr. Gabriel
and Ms. Nahles, it will never win another election.
The SPD is out of touch, its programme is no
longer in accord with the times. It should be more
open economically; it should take a stand on glob-
alization and international competition. But it has-
n’t done that.
Let’s go back again to the 1980s. This was also the time
that the course was laid out for the euro in the context
of European integration ...
Correct. Helmut Schmidt and Giscard d’Estaing had
just set up the European Monetary System (EMS),
which called for fixed exchange rates between the
countries of the European Community. However, it
was a difficult birth. In the 1980s there were eleven
realignments in the EMS that is re-evaluations of the
exchange rates. In spite of these setbacks, integration
made further progress. The Single Market and the
Schengen Agreement were realised. This was backed
by the insight and political will that Europe can be
only be advanced as a joint effort. It’s like riding a
bike – you have to keep on pedalling because if you
stop you fall over. 
At the time there were also financial crises ...
I remember there always being crises, since my
involvement in government. My first day in the
Chancellor’s office in 1970 began with Karl Schiller
freeing the Bundesbank of its intervention obligation
vis-à-vis the dollar. I almost had a stroke. I had to
explain to Willy Brandt why that was necessary. Then
came the European ‘currency snake’, the forerunner
of EMS. It failed because there was always someone
who couldn’t maintain the exchange rate parity. Then
came the EWS with its eleven revaluations. And in
1992, when Mr. Soros was speculating against the
pound, the British unfortunately had to leave. There
was always some crisis.
Is the current financial crisis fundamentally different?
This crisis has a new quality – only because of its
dimensions. This is due to increasing globalisation.
The states depend so strongly on each other that
undesirable developments are expanded exponential-
ly. Fluctuations become greater. This crisis also accel-
erates the shifts in the international balance of power.
China and India have increased their weight in world
politics. The United States with its gigantic mountain
of debt has been weakened.
You studied economics in the 1950s. Then John
Maynard Keynes was the guru of the economists. Are
we experiencing his comeback in the financial and eco-
nomic crisis?
I don’t think that the return to Keynesianism in eco-
nomic policy will be permanent. At least not to the
simple state dirigisme of his time. Just image, in my
final examination at the University of Göttingen in
1955 I defended the thesis that the amount of indebt-
edness is limited by tax revenue. I was given the grade
‘good’ for this (laughs). Today of course I would not
put it that way – and John Maynard Keynes probably
wouldn’t either.